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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000911

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SUBJECT: EU OPTIONS FOR SOMALIA SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
MISSION HEADING OUR WAY

REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 878

[1](#)B. USEU BRUSSELS 810

[1](#)C. USEU BRUSSELS 886

Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reason 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C//NF) Summary: We expect the EU to lay the groundwork for an EU Somalia security sector reform mission before its traditional August recess. An EU Council-European Commission paper on future options in Somalia will be discussed by EU Political and Security Committee Ambassadors on July 3. The options paper was circulated July 1 and will be discussed by the PSC Ambassadors, without analysis by subordinate committees, so that EU Foreign Ministers can clearly signal the future direction of EU action in Somalia by the end of July. These time constraints would require moving quickly and working at all levels, should we want to influence EU decision-making in advance of the July ministerial.

[1](#)2. (C//NF) Contacts among EU Council Secretariat, EU Military Staff, and Member State diplomats say they wish to coordinate the EU's plans with the United States. EU Member State and Council Secretariat officials have indicated that the PSC may authorize sharing the EU options paper with the U.S., so that we might provide input on EU plans before they are finalized.

Beyond a merely coordinated approach, EU officials indicate they hope to collaborate with the U.S. on training and equipping Somali security forces. For any U.S.-EU discussions to be productive, we should be prepared to describe USG capacity-building efforts in the region and to field requests for the U.S. to consider equipping EU-trained security forces. End Summary.

DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR AN SSR MISSION

[1](#)3. (C) As reported REF A, the EU Council Secretariat, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and the European Commission are collaborating on a paper outlining options for future EU engagement in Somalia. The paper, which was distributed to Member State delegations on July 1, contains detailed annexes for each of the six lines of action outlined by EU High Rep Javier Solana in a letter to EU foreign and defense ministers in May (REF B). In a June 26 meeting with EUMS contacts, USEU PolOff learned that the annex on security sector reform (SSR) outlines three options for an EU mission:

-- a military train-and-equip mission that would essentially bring the French effort to train Somali forces in Djibouti under an EU flag (REF A).

-- A civ-mil mission with joint command and control.

-- A civilian European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) SSR mission along the lines of what the EU has now in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau.

14. (C) France is pressing hard to get the EU to participate in a training mission for Somali forces in Djibouti. On June 30, the French pol-mil counselor told PolOff that France plans to launch its training mission as soon as possible on a national basis, rather than waiting for an EU decision, so as to fulfill its pledge to train a Somali battalion in Djibouti. The French counselor acknowledges that, due to the ongoing crisis in Mogadishu and the difficulty in identifying reliable interlocutors in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the anticipated 500 Somali soldiers may not be available for the training, emphasizing, nonetheless, that their mission would train fewer than 500. The French will press other EU Member States to launch an EU operation that continues this effort to train Somali forces in Djibouti over the longer term, until 3,000 Somali soldiers are trained.

#### UK RELUCTANCE

15. (C) Other contacts doubt the French will succeed in

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convincing other Member States to adopt this plan. According to EUMS sources, the UK had principled objections to the French proposal and some other EU Member States are leery of any military mission ashore. On July 1, the UK's pol-mil officer told PolOff that he doubts the French initiative will gain the approval of the other Member States. He said the UK is not against EU security sector engagement, but argued that a training effort in Djibouti without a larger framework will not be useful. The UK reportedly had a ministerial level meeting on June 30, chaired by FM Miliband, to discuss the issue. London is already considering the kind of support the EU could provide to the Puntland and Somaliland authorities to strengthen their coast guard and police capacities -- recognizing the difficulties associated with corruption in both regions. For South/Central Somalia, the UK pol-mil officer said London recognizes the need to take action -- in part to "catch up" to the U.S. and France -- but not to act so hastily that the action is ineffective. According to EUMS sources, the hesitation over the French idea makes a civilian SSR mission a more likely option.

#### ITALY ADVOCATES EU ACTION

16. (C//NF) Italy is a leading advocate of a strong EU role, and the Italian EU delegation says it is confident of support from the Swedish EU Presidency. Reacting to UK objections, Italian Political Officer Alessandro Prunas opined to USEU poloff that the UK objections seemed tactical, aimed at preserving an independent voice for the UK on Somalia for as long as possible before the common EU position is established in late July. Prunas confirmed that Italy also plans to reopen its embassy in Mogadishu, but could not offer a date. He said the European Commission would be interested in establishing an EU presence in an Italian embassy in Mogadishu. He projected that Italy would probably contribute to training Somali police.

17. (C) EU and Member State officials express their desire to work with the U.S. to ensure complementary approaches to SSR in Somalia, and even to consider direct cooperation. The EUMS is considering how to work with the U.S. to match up comparative advantages. EUMS planners have approached us to inquire whether the U.S. would be willing to participate in an EU SSR mission in Somalia. Our contacts also again asked

whether the U.S. would be willing to provide equipment to EU-trained Somali security forces (REF A), stating that they were considering including such a proposal in the options paper for PSC discussion. French, Swedish, UK, and Italian contacts encouraged cooperation with the United States and welcomed our proposal (REF C) to include the EU in the security sector assessment in August (possibly contingent on PSC authorization).

#### MOVING QUICKLY TOWARD FURTHER ACTION

¶8. (C) PSC Ambassadors will discuss options for enhanced EU action in Somalia on Friday, July 3. According to the pol-mil counselor for the Swedish EU Presidency, EU Foreign Ministers will also discuss options for enhanced EU support to the Somali security sector at their July 27-28 GAERC meeting. The pol-mil counselor expects that ministers will signal the EU's political commitment to further action, but will not take a specific decision before the August break. The pol-mil counselor said, however, that after initial discussions in early July, the PSC would task the EUMS, Council Secretariat, and possibly working groups to develop further a few options for future decision. The UK pol-mil officer on July 1 said the Swedish approach of requesting an options paper quickly, but not necessarily seeking a decision on the mission at the July Foreign Ministers' meeting, was smart and helpful. The French, however, are not yet willing to rule out the possibility of a decision for mission launch at that meeting.

¶9. (C//NF) While this timeline suggests an extensive

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deliberative process, contacts stress that the best time to influence EU decision-making is before options papers are presented to EU Perm Reps. By the time Foreign Ministers signal EU engagement in late July, we expect EU Member States to have agreed on a course of action. This would mean U.S. engagement throughout this month, as the Secretariat and EU working groups are further developing select SSR options.

¶10. (C//NF) We will have our first opportunity for a structured exchange during a July 7 videoconference with the Council Secretariat, EU Military Staff planners, and European Commission officials. In addition, Swedish EU Presidency contacts have suggested the possibility of a meeting at ambassadors level later in the month, an idea the French delegation supports. As part of this engagement, the EU may offer to share its options papers with us, either for U.S. comment or to inform further discussions. Contacts indicate that this may be authorized by EU PSC Ambassadors on Friday. During upcoming discussions, EU interlocutors will seek details of our vision for capacity building in Somalia and the region, and our readiness to work with them on the training and equipment needs of Somali security forces.

MURRAY

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